CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO A—SPEEDY TRIAL

Art. 32A.01. Trial priorities

Insofar as is practicable, the trial of a criminal action shall be given preference over trials of civil cases, and the trial of a criminal action against a defendant who is detained in jail pending trial of the action shall be given preference over trials of other criminal actions.

Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 1970, ch. 787, § 1, eff. July 1, 1978.

Art. 32A.02. Time limitations

Sec. 1. A court shall grant a motion to set aside an indictment, information, or complaint if the state is not ready for trial within:

(1) 180 days of the commencement of a criminal action if the defendant is accused of a felony;

(2) 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action if the defendant is accused of a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for more than 180 days; or

(3) 60 days of the commencement of a criminal action if the defendant is accused of a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for 180 days or less or punishable by a fine only.

Sec. 2. (a) Except as provided in Subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a criminal action commences for purposes of this article when an indictment, information, or complaint against the defendant is filed in court, unless prior to the filing the defendant is either detained in custody or released on bail or personal bond to answer for the same offense or any other offense arising out of the same transaction, in which event the criminal action commences when he is arrested.

(b) If a defendant is to be retried following a mistrial, an order granting a new trial, or an appeal or collateral attack, a criminal action commences for purposes of this article on the date of the mistrial, the order granting a new trial, or the remand.

(c) If an indictment, information, or complaint is dismissed on motion of the defendant, a criminal action commences for the purposes of the article when a new indictment, information, or complaint against the defendant is filed in court, unless the defendant is either detained in custody or released on bail or personal bond to answer for the same offense or any other offense arising out of the same transaction, in which event the criminal action commences when he is detained or released.

Sec. 3. The failure of a defendant to move for discharge under the provisions of this article prior to trial or the entry of a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of the rights accorded by this article.

Sec. 4. In computing the time by which the state must be ready for trial, the following periods shall be excluded:

(1) a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings involving the defendant, including but not limited to proceedings for the determination of competence to stand trial, hearing on pretrial motions, appeals, and trials of other charges;

(2) any period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial;

(3) a period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant or his counsel, except that a defendant without counsel is deemed not to have consented to a continuance unless the court advised him of his right to a speedy trial and of the effect of his consent;

(4) a period of delay resulting from the absence of the defendant because his location is unknown and:

(A) he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution; or

(B) the state has been unable to determine his location by due diligence;

(5) any period of delay during which the defendant is absent because he is a fugitive or his bail is forfeited or because he resists being returned to the state for trial;

(6) a reasonable period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the state if the continuance is granted:

(A) because of the unavailability of evidence that is material to the state's case, if the state has exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe the evidence will be available within a reasonable time; or

(B) to allow the state additional time to prepare its case and the additional time is justified because of the exceptional circumstances of the case;

(7) if the charge is dismissed upon motion of the state or the charge is disposed of by a final judgment and the defendant is later charged with the same offense or another offense arising out of the same transaction, the period of delay from the date of dismissal or the date of the final judgment to the date the time limitation would commence running on the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge;

(8) a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run, if there is good cause for not granting a severance;

(9) a period of delay resulting from detention of the defendant in another jurisdiction, if the state is aware of the detention and exercises due diligence to obtain his presence for trial;

(10) any period the defendant is released from custody without bail;

(11) any reasonable period of delay caused by exceptional circumstances not under the direct control of the state's attorney, including the completion, by another agency, of scientific analysis necessary to determine the offense to be charged; and

(12) any other reasonable period of delay that is justified by exceptional circumstances.