|  Defendant, XXXX XXXX XXXX, previously filed a motion requesting a trial by jury representing a fair cross-section of the community as required by the amendment VI of the United States Constitution. Defendant XXXX supplements that previous motion with this memorandum of law and specifically requests that the Court quash the jury panel.
On October 22, 2000, the Dallas Morning News published its statistical analysis of the composition of juries in Dallas County. (A copy of the this article as published on the Dallas Morning Newsâ "website" is attached.) In conducting this analysis, the Dallas Morning News interviewed Donna Roach, the individual in charge of issuing the jury summons for the Crowley Courts Building. Ms. Roach explained that State of Texas provides her with a "jury pool" for Dallas County. This "jury pool" is computer data "downloaded" on a "C.D.Rom" that contains a list of Dallas County residents on the basis of voter registration information compiled by the State, and driverâs license records compiled by the Texas Department of Public Safety, who are believed to be qualified jurors. This database of names is programmed to randomly generate the names which will comprise the jury summons issued for any given week. The Dallas Morning News tracked the issuance of 13,612 summons for the first week in March, 2000. It then randomly provided a questionnaire to 400 of those people who responded to the summons and reported for jury duty, and 400 people who failed to respond. This analysis established that 25% of the summons issued were to individuals who identified themselves as Hispanic, and that only 7% of those who reported for jury duty identified themselves as Hispanic. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that a criminal defendant has the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendmentâs impartiality requirement to mean that a jury must represent a fair cross-section of the community. E.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). The notion of an impartial jury is symbolized by a group composed of people representing the various values, viewpoints, and experiences of a particular community. To satisfy the representative requirement of the Sixth Amendment, however, juries must be randomly selected from the community. Taylor v. Louisiana,419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). The fair cross-section requirement does not entitle a defendant to a jury that mirrors the community and reflects the numerous distinctive groups present in the population. Id., at 538. Rather, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the opportunity for a representative jury by requiring that jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which trial courts draw juries must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. If a jury wheel, pool, panel, or venire systematically excludes distinctive groups, then the resulting jury fails to constitute a fair cross-section of the community. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979). In Duren, the Supreme Court set forth a clear three part test to establish a prima facie case of the violation of the fair cross-section requirement: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. If a defendant successfully proves that a prima facie fair cross-section violation has occurred, the burden shifts to the government to show that "those aspects of the jury selection process . . . that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group" advance a significant state interest. Id., at 367-68. There is no doubt that the group alleged to be excluded in this case is a "distinctive" group in the community. Mexican-Americans with Spanish surnames are a clearly identifiable class with a history of subjugation to discriminatory treatment. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). There is also no doubt that an absolute statistical disparity of 18% establishes that Hispanics are underrepresented. Courts have routinely conceded that an absolute statistical disparity of over 10% percent meets the second prong of the test. See United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511, (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 587 (10th Cir. 1976). The real issue in this case is whether this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. On first consideration one might consider systematic exclusion to be synonymous with a jury selection process which engages in intentional discrimination. This notion, however, would be mistaken. A defendant need not show purposeful discrimination; he "need only show that the jury selection procedure Îsystematically exclude[s] distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonable representative thereof." Castanada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). With respect to this issue, a useful comparison may be made between this case and Cerda v. Texas, 644 S.W.2d 875 (Tx. Ct. App. - Amarillo 1982). In Cerda, the defendant challenged the Hale County grand jury on the basis that it denied him equal protection of the law. The defendant established a prima facie case that there had been a substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans, that went unrebutted. In Cerda the court of appeals acknowledged that Mexican-Americans were an identifiable class. The Court of Appeals accepted the defendantâs evidence the population of Hale County was 38.03%, that the venire for grand jury service was 25% Mexican-American, but only 16.67% of the grand jurors selected were Mexican-American. Based on the figures the Court of Appeals concluded that the State had a burden to rebut the evidence of apparent discrimination. Because the State failed to do so, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered the indictment dismissed. In Cerda, based on absolute disparities similar to that in Dallas County today, the Court of Appeals ordered the indictment dismissed in the absence of rebuttal evidence from the State. In this case, there is direct evidence of "systematic" problems which give rise to the disparity. First, Dallas County does virtually nothing to enforce its jury summons. Counsel proffers that Donna Roach, the jury clerk responsible for the jury summons to the Crowley Criminal Courts building, will testify that it is the practice of the District Clerkâs office to take no steps to enforce the summons by punishing violators who ignore the summons. The only mechanism for the district clerk to enforce the summons is to request a district judge to issue a capias for those who fail to report. This action is virtually never taken, and the defendant asks this Court itself to acknowledge for the record, when, if ever, it has attempted to enforce a jury summons by issuing a capias for someone who failed to report when summonsed. In addition, the Dallas Morning News surveyed established that those individuals who failed to report overwhelming did so simply because they could not afford to do so. Individuals who have household incomes under $35,000 were disproportionately Hispanic. Dallas County pays jurors only $6.00 per day and State law does not require employers to pay employees who are absent as a result of jury service. As a result many Hispanic individual summonsed are confronted with the choice of foregoing the earnings necessary to meet minimal household expenses are reporting for jury service. In this case there is no doubt that Hispanics are a "distinctive group" within the community. There is no doubt that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to such persons in the community. Finally, this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of this group in the jury selection process as a result of this Countyâs failure to enforce the jury summons and because this County then makes jury service so personally and financially onerous that many people can not or will not serve. This Court should quash the panel in this case and take measures to insure that the venire from which the defendantâs venire is selected represent a "fair cross-section" of the Dallas County community. |